Magonia 95, May 2007
Stanton T. Friedman has recently made several significant changes in the Roswell mythology. He now claims that numerous U.S. aircraft have been lost in dogfights with flying saucers. At the 4th Annual UFO Crash Retrieval Conference, held on November 10-12, 2006, Friedman stated that he was investigating “at least 7 specific cases in which the UFOs zapped attacking Earthling aircraft”. He added that he was also “working on a claim by a pilot that UFOs took out 20 of our planes in Europe in the early 1950s.” 
Friedman did not give aircraft types, serial numbers, crew names, or other specific details of these losses. He was challenged on this, and wrote “One critic wanted signed sworn statements and full investigative reports of the destroyed planes which of course but not surprisingly, I don’t have.” 
At the same time, Friedman also greatly expanded the scale of the alleged saucer recoveries. This was no longer limited to the one (or two) saucers from the Roswell incident, but now, he stated, “I would say we’ve probably retrieved dozens of crashed saucers.”
As with other crashed saucer stories, details are lacking, the claims are unsubstantiated, and nothing in the way of evidence is offered. Nor does Friedman or other individuals give any indications that they understand what would be done with such vehicles if they were actually recovered. 
During a debate on UFO Updates in early 2005 about the impact of captured saucers on Cold War history. Friedman wrote, “Why would we be told about a connection between Roswell and what happened in the outside world?” He continued that, “Changes on the inside are not the same as changes on the outside. Remember you can’t tell your friends without telling your enemies. Without access to the data, there is no way to know., what the impact has been.” 
Friedman’s argument shows an inability to understand that secret actions have public consequences. This was indicated by a comment he made in the documentary Hangar 18: The UFO Warehouse in late 2006. Referring to the recovery of “unknown aerial vehicles.” he said, “But it doesn’t matter whether you’re talking about airplanes or saucers.” 
It is ironic that Friedman should draw the analogy between captured aircraft and crashed saucers, without recognizing the consequences for the Roswell incident. It is doubly ironic that he is correct in both the scale of the U.S. aircraft losses, and in the number of captured “unknown aerial vehicles.” The analogy and its consequences was a realization I made nearly a decade ago, after reading reports on the ‘YF-110B’.
A major threat facing U.S. pilots flying against North Vietnam in the late 1960s was the MiG21. In part this was because American fighter pilots had received little training in air-to-air combat tactics. Between October 5, 1966 and January 14, 1968, a total of 21 U.S. Air Force aircraft were destroyed by North Vietnamese MiG-21s. These were ten F-lOSDs, five F-4Ds, three F-IOSFs, and one F-4C, one RF-101C, and one EB-66C.  By the end of 1967, the U.S. military realized that changes had to be made. The first step was to “know your enemy.” To do this required a MiG-21. This was soon arranged.
“Have Doughnut” was the code name for the examination and flight tests of a MiG21F-13 aircraft. This was a joint project between the Foreign Technology Division (FTD) and the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). Although FTD, located at Wright-Patterson AFB was best known for Project Blue Book, its primary responsibity was collection of technical intelligence on Soviet aircraft and missiles. Have Doughnot would also involve pilots from the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB and Navy test squadron VX-4 at Point Magu.
Have Doughnut began with the departure of the thirteen man team at 1600 hours local time on January 13, 1968 aboard a C-141A transport plane. Their equipment, which included a truck, two trailers, three aircraft jacks, a large supply of plywood and lumber, two radial and two saber saws, five sets of metric tools, six tarpaulins, twenty overalls, and ten pairs of gloves, was also aboard the C141A. The team arrived at the “acquisition site” at 1340 hours local time on January 15. The equipment was unloaded after nightfall for security, and the transport then flew to a staging site.
The disassembly of the MiG-21 v.Ls scheduled to take seven days, but was actually completed in five days. This involved removing the aft fuselage, wings, stabilizers, and afterburner section. By 1800 hours local time on January 20, the aircraft parts were loaded on trucks, and taken to a C-133A transport, which had replaced the C-141A due to maintenance problems. The C-133A departed the acquisition site at 0200 hours on January 21.
The return journey took nearly three days. The C-133A finally arrived at the “test site” late on the evening of January 23, and reassembly began the next day. All the parts were uncrated and inspected for any damage. The reassembly was completed on February 7, 1968. This was a complicated process, as it involved not only putting the MiG back together, but also simultaneously adding test instruments to the vehicle, conducting a 50-hour phase inspection and the “subsystem expoloitation”. [7}
The subsystem exploitation is the first element in the analysis of any captured enemy aircraft. It involved a detailed examination of the MiG, from its complete systems on down to the individual parts. For Have Doughnut, this was conducted by two dufferent teams from the Aeronautical System Division at Wright-Patterson AFB.
The MiG-21's hydraulic system, for example, was found to have a conventional design, with a main and a boost system, and an emergency electric motor system. The aircraft also had a pneumatic system, with a main and emergency system. The fire protection system was considered unusual, however, as it used methylene bromide, which is highly toxic and required a bulky plumbing system.
The MiG-21's radar and gun sight systems were similar in capabilities to U.S. equipment of the early 1950s. The Soviet system's major improvement was an increased radar range gained by a novel antenna design and the missile launch computer. The SRD-2MK radar lacked any features to counter jamming. The ASP-5ND optical sight was a conventional gyro system that provided lead computation for air-to-air gun fire and rockets, and an aiming reference for missile launch, air-to-ground gunnery and bombing. The VRD-2A missile computer signaled the pilot when he was within range to fire the Atoll infrared-guided missiles.
The structure, materials and construction methods used in the MiG-21 were also examined. No unique manufacturing techniques were found, and the aluminium alloys used in the MiG were comparable to the 7075 and 2024 alloys used in U.S. aircraft. The use of large aluminium panels in the construction of the aircraft nose was considered unusual, as were the many steel components in the aircraft. There were no indications of structural weakness or metal fatigue.
The aerodynamic smoothness of the aircraft was marginal. Many rivet heads on the MiG protruded well above the airframe, and there was a general waviness to the structure between the airframe frames. There were also gaps and mismatches between sections of the aircraft skin. This reflected the Soviet design philosophy of focusing on the engineering and construction of components critical to operation, reliability, or maintainability. Other elements received little care or attention. 
One unusual aspect of the exploitation effort was the examination of the markings on aircraft parts. From these, analysts determined that the aircraft’s R11F-300 jet engine was produced at Plant 26 in Ufa, during the fourth quarter of 1963, in the sixth series, and was engine production number 065. Markings showed that most of the MiG’s other components were also built during the 1963 time period. 
The MiG-21 was also given an “alias.” Military pilots recorded their flight time in a flight log. An airplane’s crew chief is also required to fill out reports on his aircraft after all flights and repair work. These documents recorded the aircraft’s type and its serial number, and were unclassified. To hide the aircraft’s real identity in the paperwork, the designation “YF-IIOB” was created for the MiG-21F-13. The aircraft was also given the serial number “68-0965.” This was a real Air Force serial number, but it had belonged to a Falcon AGM-4D air-to-air missile. The serial number was painted on the tail and U.S. insignias were added to the nose. 
The first flight of the MiG-21 was made on February 8, 1968, by Lt. Col. Joe B. Jordan, who was the Tactical Air Command project pilot for Have Doughnut. The flight time was 30 minutes, with the MiG-21 accompanied by an Air Force F-4D as chase plane. This flight was to determine the MiG21′s handling and performance characteristics. The MiG-21 and its chase plane climbed to 10,000 feet, then conducted acceleration comparisons, afterburner and engine response tests, manoeuvring qualities tests, slow speed handling evaluations, and avionics and sight system analysis. When the tests were successfully completed, both aircraft landed. In all, 29 flights of the MiG-21 were made over the following two months for performance and stability data. 
The MiG-21 was found to be easy to fly and had no dangerous characteristics. The aircraft’s turning performance and roll rate and response was good throughout the flight envelope. The MiG’s basic stability was also considered good. The engine acceleration was very slow even at high power settings. The MiG’s most serious problem was that at altitudes below 15,000 feet and at airspeeds between Mach 0.96 and 1.15, the aircraft vibrated so severely that the MiG pilot could not engage a targtarget. The cockpit instruments vibrated to the point that they were almost completely blurred. This was due to the bumps on the aircraft’s surface. 
Have Doughnut’s primary goal was the testing of U.S. aircraft and air combat tactics in mock dogfights against the MiG-21. The MiG would either “attack” the U.S. aircraft, be “attacked” by the U.S. aircraft, or the engagement would start with neither aircrait holding an advantage. The “victor” in each dogfight was determined by which pilot was able to get into a position where a “kill” of the other aircraft could be made. The “Mission Summary/Comments” for Mission 43, flown on March 2, 1968, gives an idea of the type of testing, the results, and what was learned. This flight involved a pair of F-4E fighters vs. the MiG-21 (referred to as the “test aircraft”):
“Initial conditions for the first headon engagement were established at 15,000 ft, 450 [knots]. No radar contact was obtained by the F-4′s throughout the 40 mile converging track. Visual contact was not established and a 180° level turn was executed by the F-4′s and the test aircraft. During this turn-around, the test aircraft sighted the F-4′s and initiated an attack, closing to missile range on F-4 Nr. 2, overshot and switched the attack to F-4 Nr. 1. The F-4′s were unable to visually acquire the test aircraft until missile launch was called. F-4 lead then called for a hard turn reversal as the test aircraft overshot F-4 Nr. 2. After a series of vertical manoeuvres, the test aircraft remained in an offensive posture and the engagement was terminated.
“A converging flight track was set up for the second engagement with the test aircraft at 25,000 ft, [Mach] .9, and the two F-4E’s at 15,000 and 20,000 simulating two elements in a fluid four formation. F-4 Nr.l achieved a radar lock on the test aircraft at 15 miles and turned toward the target. A climbing attack into the test aircraft was performed by both F-4′s and after several cycles of vertical ‘yoyo’s', both F4E’s aircraft were in the rear hemisphere of the test aircraft. Nr.l F-4 obtained an auto radar acquisition at 3,500 ft and closed to gun range.
The third engagement was initiated at 15,000 ft with the test aircraft in the offensive and initiating the attack from an abeam position of the F-4 element. At 3 miles range.. .the F-4′s turned into the attacker. A defensive split was performed by the F-4′s as the attacker closed to 3-4,000 ft range. F-4 Nr. 2 started a high G descending spiral and F-4 Nr. I pulled into a climb while waiting for the attacker to become committed to one target. Test aircraft elected to pursue the descending F4 Nr. 2 and F-4 Nr. 1 reversed down and effected a sandwich with the attacker. After 360° of turn, the test aircraft and F-4 Nr. 2 maintained a 180° [angle] and F-4 Nr. I was able to sandwich and achieve a missile and gun kill position on the test aircraft.
“‘Bingo’ fuel level was called by the test aircraft and it returned to base for a normal landing.
“Radar detection was successful in the second engagement as the test aircraft was 5,000 ft higher than the F-4′s providing a look-up aspect. The defensive split was successful as the subsequent sandwich achieved a kill. During the high G defensive spiral by F-4 Nr. 2 in the split, the test aircraft was unable to achieve a tracking solution. The [F-4] auto radar acquisition was used with success; however, to be more useful, the effective range capability of this mode should be expanded to 5 miles.” 
Between February 8 and March 30, 1968, the MiG-21 made a total of 102 flights. Of these, 58 were simulated air combat missions while 29 were the performance tests. Another 10 were infrared measurements flights. There were also a pilot familiarization flight, a gunnery test of the MiG’s 30 mm cannon, two flights to test the MiG’s radar against the jamming equipment on a B-52 and a B-58, and a photo flight. 
The project was now completed. Disassembly of the MiG-21 began at 1200 hours local time on April 3, and continued for the next three days. The C-133B arrived at the “test site” at 1200 hours on Sunday, April 7, 1968, and loading began an hour later. The MiG and the other equipment were on board the cargo plane by 1600 hours. The fourteen team members received a “site security debriefing” at 1615 hours. The C-133B departed the test site at 1215 hours on April 8, and arrived at the acquisition site the morning of April 10. As before, the unloading of the MiG was delayed until after sundown for security. The reassembly process was dogged by technical problems, the need for rechecks, and bad weather. Finally, on April 24, the MiG21 competed its acceptance flight and the “host a~)untry” accepted its return. [IS]
“Throw a Nickel on the Grass…”
By late 1968, three reports on Have Doughnut were completed. The first was the ‘Have Doughnut Volume I Technical’ report, which was 601 pages long. This document included a Navy vulnerability evaluation, an AFFTC performance and stability evaluation, a Strategic Air Command evaluation of the MiG21′s effectiveness against electronic countermeasures, a set of radar cross section measurements, propulsion system results, the finding from the assembly and disassembly of the MiG, an instrument evaluation, modifications made to the MiG for the test program, maintenance work done on the MiG, aircraft weights, marking analysis, aircraft visibility, and acoustic and infrared measurements of the MiG.
The ‘Have Doughnut Volume II Tactical’ report detailed the results of the mock dogfights between the MiG-21 and different U.S. fighter and attack aircraft types. The 310 page report consisted of evaluations by the Tactical Air Command, the Navy, and the Air Defense Command. The third volume. ‘Have Doughnut Special Distribution’, was a 525 page compilation from volume 1, with the Strategic Air Command evaluation deleted, and a lengthy description of the assembly and disassembly process added. The three volumes were classified “Secret.”
The three reports were highly detailed, but with a total length of 1,436 pages, the information was not in an easily digestible form. This was particularly important for those with the most direct need for the information – the pilots and aircrews fighting the MiG-21 over North Vietnam. This was provided by a training film, titled “Throw a Nickel on the Grass.” which was shown to U.S. fighter, interceptor, and attack pilots.
Despite Friedman’s repeated claim that “you can’t tell your friends without telling your enemies,” the film made no attempt to hide the existence of the captured MiG-21. The film’s narration began, “An ideal way to develop combat skill against an enemy aircraft would be to fly the enemy aircraft yourself before you had to fight it. Of course. that’s an impossible ideal. Or is it?” Video and still photos were shown during the film of the MiG21 in U.S. markings at the test site.
The presenters, Colonel Jordan and Navy Commander Thomas J. Cassidy, Jr. of VX-4, began with a brief technical description of the MiG-21, and then moved to its vulnerabilities. The MiG pilot’s poor visibility was one such shortcoming. The 4-inch thick bullet-proof windshield made it hard for the MiG pilot to see approaching aircraft head on. An F-4 could only be spotted at 3 to 5 nautical miles, and smoke trails at up to 15 miles. There was no aft visibility in a 50 to 60 degree cone to the rear, while a metal flap on the top of the ejection seat blocked upward visibility. The pilot could not see another aircraft to either side if it was 20 degrees below the horizon. This large blind area was a major tactical shortcoming of the MiG-21.
The film then detailed the strengths and weaknesses of different U.S. aircraft against the MiG-21, as indicated by the simulated dogfights. These were the F-4, F-8, F-105, F-106, F-100, F-104, F-111, and the Navy’s A-4, A-6, and A-7 attack aircraft. The MiG-21 was highly manoeuvrable below 500 knots, and could outturn the U.S. aircraft. The MiG’s low speed acceleration was poor, however, and several seconds were required for the engine to reach full power. In contrast, the U.S. aircraft were more powerful, and could easily out-accelerate the MiG-21 at low altitude.
Jordan and Cassidy ended by summing up the tactics for use against the MiG21. Rather than getting into a low-speed dogfight, where the MiG-21 held the manoeuvring advantage, U.S. pilots should keep their speed above Mach 0.95, and drive the fight to low altitude. This would put the MiG at a disadvantage, as it would be vibrating severely and be unable to engage the U.S. aircraft. Forcing the MiG into a hard turn would cause it to slow abruptly. The Soviet aircraft’s poor acceleration meant it could not quickly regain speed. The U.S. pilot could then use his plane’s superior power to either attack or outrun the MiG. A U.S. aircraft attacking a MiG-21 could also exploit its large blind area to get into position and fire a missile before the enemy pilot realized the threat. 
Showing “Throw a Nickel on the Grass” to pilots who would soon be flying combat over North Vietnam risked exposure of Have Doughnut. A captured pilot might break under interrogation and talk about the film. But intelligence is only valuable if it is used. If ttkeknowledge about the MiG was withheld, aircraft and crews would be lost unnecessarily, and the whole effort would have been pointless.
The large number of people who now knew about the MiG-21 from participating in the effort, reading the reports, or seeing the training film made a press leak inevitable. This came in the February 17, 1969 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology. The item read:
“Soviet MiG-21 fighter was secretly brought to the U.S. last spring and flight tested by USAF pilots to learn first-hand its capabilities and design characteristics. The aircraft, which engaged in simulated combat against U.S. fighters, was highly regarded by the pilots who flew it. The MiG-21 was particularly impressive at altitudes over 25,000 ft. The evaluation was part of a broad effort by USAF to detail the threat of Soviet air power in planning new aircraft, such as the F-15 fighter.” 
Have Doughnut soon had public consequen,os, both in the design of new U.S. fighters and also in aircrew training. The Navy established the Top Gun program. The Air Force counterpart was Red Flag, a large scale war game carried out over the Nellis AFB range. Both programs had “aggressor pilots” flying F-5s to simulate MiG-21s. Top Gun and Red Flag were widely
publicized. “Constant Peg” was not.
Constant Peg involved a secret squadron of about twenty-five MiG-17s, MiG21s, and MiG-23s established in 1977. The MiG-21s still used the designation of YF-110B, while the MiG-23s were called °YF-113Bs” and “YF-113Es.” The unit operating the MiGs was designated the 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron (TES) and operated from an airfield on the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada. The first 4477th TES commander was Col. Gaillard R. Peck. (The “Peg” in the code name was his wife.) 
The Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots selected to fly against the MiGs in Constant Peg deployed for two weeks. They initially made a familiarization flight to observe the MiGs in flight and study their characteristics. Peck recalled the reaction of the young pilots at seeing a real live MiG: “They would pull up beside you in formation, and you could almost see their eyeballs popping out of their heads. It was that exciting for them.” This was followed by one-on-one simulated dogfights, and then two-on-two missions. The scale of Constant Peg was remarkable. Between 1977 and 1988, a total of about 6,800 pilots flew against the MiGs. 
Constant Peg faced many unusual demands. Little in the way of technical data was available on the MiGs, and spare parts were, to say the least, difficult to acquire. This resulted in a poor safety record. The 4477th TES had 100 accidents for every 100,000 hours of flight time. The normal Air Force accident rate was 4 in every 100,000 hours.  The unit stopped flying MiG-17s following an accident in 1981. Capt. Mark F. Postai crash landed a MiG-17 in the desert following an engine failure. He survived the accident, but died in a MiG-23 crash during 1983. He was one of two 4477th TES pilots killed during Constant Peg. [21 ]
The 4477th TES pilots were not only from the Air Force, but also included Navy and Marines. They usually had backgrounds as Top Gun and Red Flag aggressor pilots, or were weapons school instructors. The enlisted personnel were usually senior noncommissioned officers. The 4477th TES pilots would fly as many as three missions a day in the MiGs, lasting an hour or less each.  The assessments of the MiG-21s and MiG-23s by the Constant Peg pilots were very different. The MiG-21 was judged to be a highly manoeuvrable pure fighter. The MiG-23, on the other hand, was considered an unsuccessful attempt by the Soviets to build a multi-role fighter bomber. The MiG-23 was fast, but had poor stability. All the 4477th TES commanders considered it too dangerous to fly. 
Constant Peg was a “Black” project. like Have Doughnut a decade before. The personnel assigned to the Tonopah Test Range wore civilian clothing to avoid attracting attention, and could not discuss thei assignment with their families. The next of kit of the two pilots killed during the program were not told how they had died. The MiGs were kept in their hangars or sent into the ai whenever Soviet reconnaissance satellites wer overhead. Any military pilot who made a emergency landing at the airfield signed secrecy agreement not to discuss what he had seen.
But also like Have Doughnut, Constant Peg was soon an open secret. The first major leak occurred at the same time as tt project started. The Armed Forces Journal International issue for September 1977 carried the article “Soviet Jets in USAF Use – The Secret MiG Squadron.” It said that the MiGs were used in the training of U.S. pilots, and speculated that the U.S. could have as many as 20 MiGs of different types. 
The sheer scale of Constant Peg, both in the number of pilots participating and the number of MiGs involved, made it impossible to keep the effort secret. Pilots would quietly discuss their experiences at officers clubs. At least one sighting of a MiG-21 in flight was made by a civilian near Edwards AFB. Constant Peg was closed down in 1988, due to its cost and the ending of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, more information began to emerge. Pictures were published of both the Have Doughnut aircraft and other U.S. MiG-21s. The YF-110 and YF-113 designations became known, as did the broad outlines of the effort. Eventually, both MiG-21s and MiG-23s were put on display. The code name “Constant Peg” was public long before it was finally declassified in November of 2006. Finally, any doubts about what aircraft were flown by the 4477th TES were eliminated by the unit’s name – “Red Eagles.”
MiG History vs. Roswell Mythology
Stanton Friedman’s analogy that there would be no difference between captured aircraft and crashed saucers has validity on several levels. From a narrow military viewpoint, flying a military vehicle within U.S. airspace or attacking U.S. aircraft are both acts of war. Whether the vehicles were Soviet or Martian does not matter. They were a threat that had to be analyzed and countered.
Have Doughnut and Constant Peg gave the U.S. access to flyable MiGs. But tactical evaluations were also conducted without a flyable enemy vehicle. Project Feather Duster was conducted between May and October 1965 at Nellis AFB. Like the Have Doughnut mock dogfights more than two years later, Feather Duster evaluated tactics for U.S. aircraft against the lighter and more manoeuvrable MiG aircraft they were r,.w facing over North Vietnam. As no real MiGs were then available, F-86H fighters served as stand-ins. The very same procedures were used in both cases – pre-planned engagements to see which tactics worked and which did not. The F86Hs could not exactly simulate the higher performance MiGs, but within these limitations Feather Duster showed similar results to the later Have Doughnut tests. The Feather Duster results, like those from Have Doughnut, were distributed to U.S. fighter pilots. 
The analogy between crashed saucers and captured aircraft has major consequences for the Roswell mythology. If the U.S. military had recovered any crashed saucers and/or if its aircraft had engaged alien spacecraft in dogfights, then the exact same procedures as with the MiGs would have been followed. Further, these analyses would be distributed widely, as numerous intelligence organizations, military units, and individual pilots would have a”need to know.” And, just as with the MiG data, it would leak to the press and public.
The analogy between U.S. MiG operations and Roswell also point out the difference between history and mythology. The Have Doughnut and Feather Duster reports and other documents, photos of the MiG-21, and the “Throw a Nickel on the Grass” training film are now declassified. The MiGs are on display and participants in Constant Peg have described their experiences. This is historical evidence, of such a scale and type to prove beyond doubt that these activities occurred.
The Roswell mythology paints a very different picture. The historical evidence available for the U.S. MiG operations is totally lacking with the Roswell incident. There are no technical reports on alien crash debris or the “dozens” of recovered saucers. There are no counterparts of the Feather Duster or Have Doughnut reports on tactics for use against flying saucers.
Indeed, the proponents of the Roswell incident reject historical evidence. They dismiss the lack of records for a nurse named “Naomi Selff;” who Glenn Dennis claimed participated in an alien autopsy at Roswell, and later died in a plane crash. No nurse with this name was stationed at Roswell or ever served in the U.S. military. None of the five nurses at the base in July 1947 were involved in a plane crash. Friedman said that he “located someone who had been stationed at the base and confirmed recalling nurse Naomi Self[f] and described her the same way Glenn had.” 
Crashed saucer proponents also dismiss historical records which indicate the metal foil, balsa wood sticks, and rubber fwgments found near Roswell were from a Project Mogul balloon flight. Instead, they prefer decades old recollections of witnesses as to the debris’ alleged exotic nature and the amount of material. In a memorable sound bite, Dr. Mark Rodeghier, the Center for UFO Studies’ scientific director. made clear this attitude. He said, “There is no way that the amount of material in a Mogul balloon would fill up the area as described by the witnesses on the Roswell debris field. Now right there that’s enough for me.” 
Have Doughnut, Constant Peg, and other MiG operations made clear how serious a threat the U.S. considered these Soviet aircraft to be, and how far it would go to counter that threat. How serious a threat the U.S. considered flying saucers was also made clear by the lack of any similar efforts against alien vehicles.
- Stanton T. Freedman, “The UFO `Why?’ Questions,” 4th Annual UFO Crash Retrieval Conference, November 10-12, 2006, Las Vegas, Nevada, p. 2
- Stanton T. Freedman, “Zapped Planes,” UFO Magazine (May 2006), p. 26, 27.
- Hangar 18: The UFO Warehouse, A&E Television Networks, 2006. The Friedman comment about “dozens” of recoveries is made 36 seconds into the DVD.
- “Re; Magonia Supplement No. 54 Friedman,” http://www.virtuallystrange.net/ ufo/updates/2005/feb/m12-015.shtml, February 12, 2005
- Hangar 18: The UFO Warehouse. Friedman’s comments start at 19 minutes and 47 seconds.
- Rob Young, “U.S. Aircraft Lost To MiGs in Southeast Asia, 1965-1972,” National Air Intelligence Center History Office.
- Have Doughnut Special Distribution, p. 13-1 to 13-6. The identities of the “acquisition site” and “test site” are still considered classifi
- 8. Have Doughnut Volume I Technical, FTD-CR-20-13-69 INT, Defense Intelligence Agency, November 1, 1968, p. 1-16, and 6-7 to 6-14
- ibid, p. 11-1 to 11-8.
- The designation “YF-110B” translates as preproduction (Y) fighter (F) number one hundred and ten (110) second model (B). The “68-0965″ serial number meant this was the nine hundred and sixty fifth aircraft or missile built for the U.S. Air Force in Fiscal Year 1968. Regarding the “MiG-21 F-13,” the Soviets designated aircraft by their design bureau rather than as a fighter. “MiG” meant the Mikoyan (M) and (i) Gurevich (G) bureau. The “21″ was the numerical sequence (MiG jet fighters were given odd numbers- 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, etc). The “F” was not a letter sequence, but stood for Forsazh (afterburner), while “-13″ was the model number of the export version.
- Have Doughnut Volume II Tactical, FTD-CR-20-13-69 INT, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Annex A, Tactical Mission Summaries,” p. 1-49 to 1-52.
- ibid, and Have Doughnut Special Distribution, p. 2-1 to 2-18.
- Have Doughnut Volume II Tactical, p. 1-81 and 1-
- Ibid, p. 2-68 to 2-73.
- Ibid, p. 13-12 to 13-26.
- “Throw a Nickel on the Grass” United States Air Force Report FR 1015 1968
- ”Industrial Observer,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (February 17, 1969), p. 13.
- “News and Events” Col. (Ret.) Gail Peck, National Museum of the USAF web site.
- James Hannah, “Air Force takes wraps off secret MiG program,” Akron Beacon Journal web site, posted November 16, 2006, and Stephan Wilkinson, “Briefing American MiGs,” Aviation History (May 2007), p. 9
- Hannah, “Air Force takes wraps off secret MiG program,” and Bruce Rolfsen, “Details of secret MiG squadron unfold,” Military City.com, November 17, 2006.
- Timothy R. Gaffney, “Constant Peg: When U.S. pilots “battled” MiGs,” Dayton Daily News, November 22, 2006.
- Rolfsen, “Details of secret MiG squadron unfold.”
- Gaffney, “Constant Peg: When U.S. pilots “battled” MiGs.”
- Hannah, “Air Force takes wraps off secret MiG program.”
- F. Clifton Berry, Jr. and Benjamin F. Schemmer, “Soviet Jets in USAF Use – The Secret MiG Squadron,” Armed Forces Journal International (September 1977), p. 26, 27
- “Air Combat Tactics Evaluation – F100, F-104, F-105, F-4, F-5, A-1 E Versus MiG 15, 17, 19, 21 Type Aircraft (F-86H). Part I(U)” Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB VA. (June 1966). [Project Feather Duster report].
- “Interview with Stanton Friedman,” http://cubbrasil.net/staton.htm
- Conspiracy? “Majestic Twelve: UFO Cover-Up A&E Television Networks, 2004. Dr. Rodeghier’s comments about the debris field size start at 36 minutes and 53 seconds into the DVD.